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SUMMARY 
Each takeoff includes the possibility that the pilot needs to stop the aircraft and 
reject the takeoff. Aborts at a high speed above V1 are rare. However when they 
occur the outcome can be serious accident. In 1989, in reaction to a number of 
takeoff accidents resulting from improper rejected takeoff decisions and 
procedures, a joint FAA/industry taskforce studied what actions might be taken 
to increase takeoff safety. From this Boeing led an industry wide effort to develop 
a training aid. The result was a publication entitled Takeoff Safety Training Aid 
and a flight crew briefing video entitled Rejected Takeoff and the Go/No Go 
Decision released in 1993. This material gives information on operational 
procedures and crew qualification programs regarding rejected takeoffs. The 
goal of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid was to minimise the probability of RTO-
related accidents. The idea is that risks could be reduced by a higher level of 
flight crew knowledge and by the use of improved procedures.  
 
In this study the impact of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid upon high speed 
rejected takeoffs is examined by analysing accidents and serious incidents that 
occurred before and after the introduction of the training aid. From this analysis 
it became clear that since the introduction of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid: 
The accident/serious incident rate of high speed rejected takeoffs has dropped 
by 25%; There is no unambiguous proof that that this reduction is the result of 
the Takeoff Safety Training Aid; The reasons for conducting a high speed 
rejected takeoff are the same as before the training aid; Many high speed 
rejected takeoffs (44%) should not have been conducted. This number is only 
slightly less than before the introduction of the training aid (51%); Pilots have 
difficulties in recognising “unsafe to fly” conditions; The Detection-Decision-
Action process still takes a lot of time! and that 82% of the RTOs were non-
engine related which is similar to before the training aid. 
 
The present study shows that there is still plenty of room to improve takeoff 
safety and reduce the number of unwarranted rejected takeoffs above V1. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
March 20, 1993. During the takeoff roll on Runway 25R of Frankfurt Airport 
(Germany), just before reaching VR, there was a loud bang and the B747 yawed 
to the left.  The Captain took over control and elected to abort.  However, by this 
time the aircraft had accelerated to 177kt, close to VR and above V1.  The 
aircraft could not be stopped on the remaining runway length and to avoid an 
overrun into the ILS installation the pilot steered the aircraft off to the right onto 
soft ground.  The initial 'bang' was caused by a buzzard being ingested into the 
No. 2 engine.  The Captain had seen a pair of buzzards hovering over the runway 
just before the bird strike and believed that both the No. 1 and No. 2 engines had 
been damaged. 
 
Each takeoff includes the possibility that the pilot needs to stop the aircraft and 
reject the takeoff. Analysis of pilot reported rejected takeoffs occurrences 
showed that the rejected takeoff manoeuvre occurs approximately once in every 
1800 takeoffs (source: NLR-ATSI). With this rate a pilot who flies primarily long-
haul routes, may be faced on average with a rejected takeoff only once in 25 
years. In contrast, a pilot on a regional jet may face a rejected takeoff every 4 
years on average. The pilots in each of these fleets must be prepared to make an 
RTO decision during every takeoff. Even to the regional pilots it will not be a 
common thing to do other than in the simulator. Analysis of pilot reported 
rejected takeoffs occurrences showed that about 56% of the rejected takeoffs 
occurred at speeds lower than 60 kt. and almost 90% below 100 kt. (source: NLR-
ATSI). Even if a pilot faces the decision to reject it is most likely at a low speed. 
To reject a takeoff at high speeds is very rare. However these are the most 
critical ones compared to the low speed aborts. Regulatory authorities have 
defined a speed up to which a safe abort can be made. Aborting a takeoff above 
the so-called V1 speed can result in fact that the remaining runway length is 
insufficient to stop the aircraft1. The pilot-not-flying will call out V1 as the aircraft 
accelerates through this speed2. If the pilot flying has not taken any action to 
stop the aircraft before this callout is made, the takeoff should be continued 
unless the aircraft is unsafe to fly. The concept of V1 has been the subject of 
many studies and discussions. Over the years changes have been made 
regarding the exact use and definition of the V1 concept. 
                                               
1
 V1 has been referred to amongst others as the critical engine failure speed, the engine failure 
recognition speed, and the takeoff decision speed. To the pilot V1 represents the minimum speed 
from which the takeoff can be safely continued following an engine failure within the takeoff 
distance shown in the aircraft flight manual AFM, and the maximum speed from which the aircraft 
can be stopped within the accelerate-stop distance shown in the AFM. These definitions are not 
restrictive as other definitions may be outlined in the AFM of a particular aircraft model. 
2
 On some modern aircraft there is an automatic callout of the V1 speed.  
  
 
 
 
8 NLR-TP-2010-177 April 2010  
 
In 1989, in reaction to a number of takeoff accidents resulting from improper 
rejected takeoff decisions and procedures, a joint FAA/industry taskforce studied 
what actions might be taken to increase takeoff safety. The taskforce produced 
nine recommendations including the development of training practices, 
operational guidelines, and improvement of simulator fidelity. From this Boeing 
led an industry wide effort to develop a training aid. The result was a publication 
entitled Takeoff Safety Training Aid and a flight crew briefing video entitled 
Rejected Takeoff and the Go/No Go Decision released in 1993. This material 
gives information on operational procedures and crew qualification programs 
regarding rejected takeoffs. The goal of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid was to 
minimise the probability of RTO-related accidents. The idea is that risks could be 
reduced by a higher level of flight crew knowledge and by the use of improved 
procedures.  
 
The big question now is, has takeoff safety improved since the introduction of 
the Takeoff Safety Training Aid? A fact is that high speed rejected takeoffs have 
not disappear since its introduction in 1993. For instance during the first month 
of 2010 two major overruns occurred after high speed rejected takeoffs3.  
This paper tries to answer the question why high speed rejected takeoffs after V1 
still occur. This is done by analysing historical data of high speed rejected 
takeoffs before and after the introduction of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid.  
 
                                               
3
 January 3rd, Boeing 737-800 at Dortmund airport (Germany) and January 19th, Canadair CRJ-200 
at Yeager airport (U.S.)  
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2 SOME OPERATIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO 
REJECTED TAKEOFFS 
A pilot may reject a takeoff for a variety of reasons, including engine failure, 
activation of the takeoff warning horn, directives from air traffic control, blown 
tires, crossing aircraft/vehicles on the runway or system warnings. However high-
speed rejected takeoffs are normally limited due to operator policy and aircraft 
manufacture guidance. Some operators and aircraft manufactures have defined a 
speed up to which a takeoff should be rejected for all observed failures or 
warnings. Above this speed and to the takeoff decision speed V1, the takeoff 
should be rejected only in case of an engine failure and conditions affecting the 
safe handling of the aircraft. However amongst the operators different policies 
exist regarding these takeoff rejection criteria. The speed up to which a takeoff 
should be rejected for all observed failures, varies between 70-100 Kt. with a 
typical value of 80 Kt. or 100 Kt. This operational practice will affect the number 
of rejected takeoffs made, especially those at high speed (say above 80 Kt.). 
Furthermore most modern aircraft have inhibits on aircraft systems warnings 
during takeoff, typically between 80 kt. and 1500 ft. This affects the opportunity 
for high speed RTOs due to misdiagnosis of minor system malfunctions at high 
speeds. Any warnings received during this period must be considered as 
significant. Above V1 the takeoff should not be rejected unless the aircraft is 
unsafe to fly. Examples of unsafe flight conditions are failure of multi engines 
and the impossibility to rotate the aircraft (e.g. due to extreme forward c.g.).  
 
In the high-speed regime, the pilot's bias should be to continue the takeoff, unless 
there is a compelling reason to reject. 
 
Source: Training supplement from a major US operator. 
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3 ANALYSIS OF HIGH SPEED REJECTED 
TAKEOFFS 
3.1 APPROACH 
The overall data analysis approach employed in this study was to: 
 
• Develop a taxonomy for the collation and analysis of the data; 
• Identify a sample of high speed rejected takeoff accidents and serious 
incidents in which the abort was started after V1 (the actual decision 
could be before V1); and, 
• Analyse the data to determine what factors and to what degree they were 
associated to high speed RTOs. These factors were compared for data 
covering the period 1980-1993 with 1994-2008. 
 
3.2 DATA INCLUSION CRITERIA 
The following criteria were used to establish the data sample: 
 
• Only occurrences that were classified as ‘accidents’ or ‘serious incidents’ 
according to ICAO Annex 13 definition were included;  
• Both fatal and non-fatal accidents were included; 
• The accidents and serious incidents involved a high speed rejected 
takeoff in which the abort was started after V1 (the actual decision to 
abort could be before V1);  
• Accidents related to unlawful or military action were excluded; 
• The occurrences involved fixed wing aircraft with a maximum takeoff 
mass of 5,500kg or higher that were used in a commercial operation 
(passenger or cargo) including training and ferry flights. There was no 
restriction to the geographical location of the occurrence; 
• Both turbofan and turboprop aircraft were considered. Piston engined 
aircraft were excluded; 
• The accidents occurred during 1980 through 2008. 
 
3.3 DATA SOURCES 
The primary data source used in this study was the NLR ATSI Air Safety database. 
For many years National Aerospace Laboratory NLR maintains a large database 
with aviation safety related data called the NLR ATSI Air Safety Database. The NLR 
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ATSI Air Safety Database is a collection of databases containing different types of 
data. The database contains detailed information on accidents and incidents of 
fixed wing aircraft from 1960 and onwards. Currently the NLR ATSI Air Safety 
Database contains detailed information on more than 40,000 accidents and 
serious incidents that occurred world-wide. For each occurrence a wide variety of 
factual information is available. For a large number of occurrences the causal and 
contributing factors are also available. Besides data on accidents and incidents 
the NLR ATSI Air Safety Database also contains a large collection of non-accident 
related data. These data include the following: airport data, flight exposure data 
(hours & flights at the level of airlines, aircraft type, and airports), weather data, 
fleet data, and more. The NLR ATSI Air Safety Database is updated frequently 
using reliable sources including data from official reporting systems, insurance 
claims, accident investigation boards, aircraft manufacturers, civil aviation 
authorities and more. Queries were conducted in the NLR ATSI Air Safety 
Database using the data inclusion criteria.  
 
3.4 TAXONOMY 
The data were analysed using a taxonomy that was developed for this study. The 
reasons for the RTO were identified, as well as correctness of the decision to 
abort, and the runway conditions. Furthermore aircraft type, operation type and 
other basic factual information were collected. 
 
Reasons for RTO initiation Explanation 
Engine failures/engine indication 
warnings 
Included are actual, temporary, or perceived 
loss of thrust and engine fires, and engine 
fire warnings. 
Wheel/tire Includes all kinds of tire/wheel vibrations or 
failures. 
Configuration Contains events such as wrong flap setting, 
wrong c.g., wrong takeoff mass, wrong 
control settings. Typically related to errors in 
the flight preparation. 
Malfunction indicator Reading observed on an indicator or warning 
light illumination. 
Crew coordination Events in which inappropriate crew actions 
resulted in an RTO. 
Bird strike Observed birds along the runway and 
experienced or perceived a problem caused 
by a bird strike. 
ATC Contains events related to ATC e.g. runway 
incursion, aborts ordered by ATC. 
Noises/vibrations Experienced or perceived vibration of the 
aircraft. 
Directional control problems Problems with maintain direction control. 
Other/ Not reported - 
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4 RESULTS 
In this section statistical results obtained from the data sample are presented 
and discussed. The complete sample encompassed 135 high speed rejected 
takeoff accidents and serious incidents. In 90% of these cases the aircraft could 
not be stopped on the runway. The statistical results are presented for the period 
1980-1993 and 1994-2008 separately. 
 
4.1 SAFETY IMPROVEMENT 
Is there an improvement in the level of safety regarding high speed rejected 
takeoffs after the introduction of the training aid? This question can be answered 
by comparing the accident/serious incident rate before the introduction of the 
training aid and after. Figure 1 shows this comparison. After the introduction of 
the takeoff safety training aid the level of safety of high speed RTOs has 
improved by some 25%. It cannot be proven that this improvement of 25% is 
solely the effect of the training aid. For instance more reliable engines, better 
quality tires and better maintenance could also have contributed. Furthermore 
most modern aircraft have inhibits on aircraft systems warnings during takeoff. 
This has reduced the opportunity for high speed RTOs due to misdiagnosis of 
minor system malfunctions at high speeds. Although the training aid was 
promoted by the big aircraft manufactures like Airbus, Boeing, and McDonnell 
Douglas, it is unclear whether other manufacturers did likewise. For instance the 
emphasis in the takeoff safety training seems to be much on jet engine aircraft 
rather than turboprops. This could mean that turboprop operators did not 
incorporate the recommendations of the training aid in to their training 
programs. 
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Rate per 10 million takeoffs  
Figure 1: Development of the accident/serious incident rate of high speed RTOs 
 
4.2 REASONS FOR HIGH SPEED RTOS 
There can be several reasons for a pilot to abort a takeoff at speeds above V1. 
Figure 2 shows the comparison for the reasons for conducting a high speed RTO 
before and after the introduction of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid. More than 
one reason could be assigned to a single RTO. The results from Figure 2 show 
that since the introduction of the takeoff safety training aid the reasons for pilots 
to make a high speed RTO have not changed much. Engine failures/engine 
indication warnings (including engine fires) and configuration issues are the main 
reasons to abort, followed by wheel/tire issues (typically tire failures). Overall 
high speed RTOs were mainly conducted for non-engine related reasons both 
before (77%) and after (82%) the introduction of the training aid.  
Although there is no simple explanation for the high share of non-engine related 
high speed RTOs the following reasoning could put some light on this issue. For 
an engine failure/fire, the crew needs to establish the condition of the engine 
(failed / not failed) in relation to the speed (before or after V1). This is a relatively 
simple comparative process involving reasonable cues (engine instruments) and 
predefined rules. The other reasons for RTOs are much less easy to assess by the 
crew. It is often not a simply comparative process and it requires a more 
knowledge based way of thinking than rule based like in the case of an engine 
failure. There is little or no guidance from aircraft certification in these situations 
other than engine failures/fires.  
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There have been others studies that examined the reasons for high speed RTOs. 
Well-known are the results presented in the Takeoff Safety Training Aid. Although 
the reasons to abort found in the present study are very similar to the ones given 
in the training aid, there are some important differences. For instance 
configuration issues have a lower frequency of occurrence in the Takeoff Safety 
Training Aid than in the present study. Wheel/tire issues have a somewhat higher 
frequency of occurrence in the takeoff safety Training Aid. There can be several 
explanations for these differences. First the data sample of present study 
included turboprop aircraft and smaller jets, whereas the takeoff training aid 
data only considered large western-built jets. Another reason is that the present 
study considered events that occurred after 1979. The data analysed in the 
Takeoff Safety Training Aid considered RTOs that occurred between 1959-1990. 
Especially during the period 1959-1979 there were a lot of events related to 
wheels/tires (28%). During the period 1980-1990 there were much less RTOs 
related to wheels/tires in the data of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid (13%). The 
reduction in this share could be due to the improvement in the quality of tires 
and/or better maintenance and inspections. This could have reduced the 
likelihood of having a tire failure. The occurrence data analysed in this paper are 
considered more representative of current operations.  
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Engine failures/engine indication warnings
Configuration
Wheel/tire
Crew coordination
Directional control problems
Noises/vibrations
Bird strike
Malfunction indicator/light
ATC
Other/ Not reported
1980-1993
1994-2008
 
Figure 2: Reasons for initiating the RTO (More than one reason could be assigned to a single 
RTO.) 
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4.3 THE DECISION TO ABORT 
Figure 3 shows a comparison of the number of unwarranted high speed RTOs. 
Considering the unknowns there is not much of difference in the relative number 
of unwarranted high speed RTOs made to abort before and after the introduction 
of the training aid. In both periods a relatively large number of decisions to abort 
were incorrect (51% and 44 % respectively). This is clearly in hindsight as most 
pilots really thought they were making the right decision at the time. Often it was 
related to complex situations e.g. an engine failure combined with significant 
vibrations which was judged by the pilots as an unsafe condition. Assessing such 
complex situations is difficult and often not well trained. There are often no 
references as to what might make the aircraft unsafe to fly making it difficult to 
the crew in recognising such a condition. The reliance on perception then 
provides the opportunity for errors in decision making.  
In table 1 the main reasons to abort during takeoffs that should have been 
continued are listed. Both engine failures/engine indication warnings and 
wheel/tire issues were identified as the most common reason. There are some 
differences in the frequencies of these common reasons before and after the 
introduction of the training aid. No good explanation could be found for this. 
The present data suggest that pilots have difficulties to take a correct decision to 
continue the takeoff if passed V1 when something happens with an engine or 
tire. This is not a new observation. It has been a factor in many RTOs in the past.  
 
During a takeoff from Frankfurt airport, just before reaching V2 there was a 
loud bang followed by severe vibration. The Captain concluded that the aircraft 
was not safe to fly and rejected the takeoff. The aircraft stopped in the 
remaining runway available. The vibrations were caused by a tire failure. Pieces 
of tyre passed forward of the wing leading edge, then back through the engine 
fan casing. Some pieces struck the fuselage, wing, and flaps, all without damage. 
The Captain later stated that he never experienced such a high level of vibration 
in an aircraft before and could not comprehend that such a level could ever 
occur. 
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No, 50.8%
Unknown, 15.9%
Yes, 33.3%
No, 44.4%
Unknown, 23.6%
Yes, 31.9%
1980-1993 1994-2008
 
Figure 3: Correct decision to abort or not 
 
Table 1: Reasons to abort during takeoffs that should have continued 
Reason 1980-1993 1994-2008 
Engine failures/engine 
indication warnings 
50% 31% 
Wheels/tires 16% 25% 
 
4.4 LATE REACTIONS 
Another critical element in rejected takeoffs is the reaction timing. Late reactions 
can result in aborts being made much after V1 whereas the call was made below 
V14, or it can increase the stopping length as such that it is not possible to stop 
on the runway. In figure 4 a comparison is made of the abort decision relative to 
V1. There is some improvement in the number of aborts called below V1 after 
the introduction of the training aid.  
                                               
4
 Current certification assumes a recognition time of 1second between the speed at which an 
engine failure occurs and V1.During flight test brakes on/throttles to idle will be at V1. In the AFM 
this is expanded to a time after V1.  
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After V1, 89%
Before V1, 11%
1994-20081980-1993
After V1, 83%
Before V1, 17%
 
Figure 4: Abort decision relative to V1 
 
Still in 11% of the high speed RTOs a decision was made below V1 whereas the 
abort itself was started much after V1. The fact that this can happen becomes 
clear when looking at human response phases. This starts with a recognition, 
then a decision, followed by a reaction. All these phases take time. A simulator 
study conducted by Qantas gave some interesting facts about decision and 
reaction times of pilots during rejected takeoffs (Qantas, 1970). In this study the 
pilots conducted a normal takeoff. However, they were not informed that an 
engine failure would occur just before V1. Some of the important results of this 
study are shown in figure 5. These data show that the time between the engine 
failure and pilot’s reaction can be very long.  
 
Less than 2 sec. 
65%
2 - 4 sec. 18%
More than 4 sec. 
17%
Time between first call 
and pilot reaction
Time between engine failure 
and first call
Less than 2 sec. 
86%
More than 4 sec. 
2% 2 - 4 sec. 12%
 
Figure 5: Reaction times after an engine failure 
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Another interesting study was conducted by Cranfield (Harris and Khan). A 
number of RTOs was conducted on a simple 747-200 simulator with a group of 
experienced airline pilots. Aborts were called at several speeds and the time to 
react was recorded. The mean response time as function of ground speed is 
shown in figure 6. As the ground speed increases the mean response time 
reduces. At low speeds the pilot has enough time to abort which is reflected by 
the data. Interesting is the fact that when V1 is approached the mean response 
time increases again. Apparently the pilot needs more time to react when 
approaching the decision speed V1. 
Mean time between first call 
and pilot reaction
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Speed (kts)
V1=141 kts
Sec.
 
Figure 6: Pilot reaction as function of ground speed 
 
Finally table 2 gives some examples of reaction times obtained from actual RTO 
accidents. These real life data show that the experimental data on reaction times 
are realistic. 
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Table 2: Examples of some reaction times from RTO accidents 
 Time between 
recognition and 
call 
Sec 
Time between 
call and pilot 
action 
sec 
Accident # 1 2.5 1.5 
Accident # 2 2.0 1.0 
Accident # 3 1.0 3.0 
Accident # 4 0.5 0.3 
Accident # 5 1.3 0.8 
 
Other delays in the response can occur when the F/O is the pilot flying. A study 
from the NTSB has suggested that difficulties and delays could occur when 
transferring the control of the aircraft from the F/O to the captain (as required by 
many airline's operating procedures5). This could add up to the total time of 
detecting a problem and reacting on it.  In the present occurrence data it could 
not always be established who the pilot flying was and if there was a transfer of 
controls. The control transfer could be limited to directional controls only in the 
case that the captain is responsible (by SOP) for handling the thrust levers 
regardless if the captain is the pilot flying or not. A simulator study conducted by 
Boeing [Roberson and Shontz, (1992)] showed that the exchange of aircraft 
control influences the stopping performance during an RTO. The study 
concluded that if the FO calls and executes the RTO the margins in remaining 
runway length during an RTO are the lowest. Based on these results Boeing 
recommended that the Capt. should call and execute all RTOs. This 
recommendation has been incorporated into many operating manuals not limited 
to Boeing aircraft. However there are some concerns regarding these tests done 
by Boeing. First of all simulator tests were conducted with a limited group of 
Boeing instructor Captains and airline Captains. No 'real' first officers were used 
in these trials (an experienced Boeing Capt. played the role of the FO). This could 
affect the realism of the trials (e.g. behaviour of less experienced FO).  Second 
                                               
5
 A survey of a large number Manufacturers Operating Manuals showed that many aircraft 
manufacturers advice to give the decision to abort to the Captain and prescribe a transfer of 
controls when the First Officer is PF. Currently many airlines have therefore the policy where the 
Captain is the only pilot allowed to call and to execute the RTO. 
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the number of trials in the Boeing simulator study was low. For instance only 6 
trials were conducted with the FO calling and executing the RTO. This could 
affect the statistical significance of the findings. Finally, the tests were conducted 
in one aircraft type only (B737). The results could be different for other aircraft 
types. However, after these experiments Boeing brought in an airline that was 
interested and tested a large group of their pilots to validate the results. These 
were airline crews that included "real" first officers. These additional tests gave 
Boeing more confidence in the recommended procedure for having the Capt. to 
decide and execute the rejected takeoff. 
 
All these above mentioned issues with reaction times illustrate that pilots need 
time to assess complex situations and to react upon them. With a typical 
acceleration of 3 to 6 knots per second, just 3 seconds for assessing the 
situation and decision-making, will add 9 to 18 knots to the speed. If the aircraft 
is close to V1, it now most likely has exceeded it. 
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5 REJECTING A TAKEOFF AFTER V1…WHY 
DOES IT STILL HAPPEN? 
There is no simple reason that explains why there are pilots that reject a takeoff 
after V1. The Takeoff safety training aid introduced in 1993 could be seen as 
valuable tool to counteract this. However, the analyses in this study showed that 
many of the issues the training aid addressed are still occurring after its 
introduction. Is this due to the fact the Training Aid did not address all the issues 
or has the training aid not been implemented on a large scale? Fact is that all FAR 
part 121 operators in the USA have implemented the training aid within a few 
years after its introduction. Other operators have introduced parts of the training 
aid in their training and procedures mainly through the (large) aircraft 
manufactures. A very brief survey amongst some European airline pilots 
suggested that the Takeoff Safety Training Aid is not well-known anymore. 
Although there is no hard evidence it could be that this applies throughout the 
commercial aviation sector. The idea of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid was that 
risks of high speed RTOs could be reduced by a higher level of flight crew 
knowledge and by the use of improved procedures. Still pilots faced with unusual 
or unique situations may perform high speed RTOs unnecessarily or may perform 
them incorrectly. This has not really changed since the introduction of the 
training aid. More emphasis could be placed on this issue by operators and 
manufactures. 
 
For pilots it is difficult to make the right decision with only limited time available. 
The RTO data for the period after the training aid still showed that in large 
portion (44%) a RTO was not the correct decision. Furthermore even if the right 
decision was made significant delays in making decisions and reactions occurred. 
Any delay could make a safe stop on the runway impossible. Experimental data 
indicates that long delays are not unlikely6. Flight crews should consider a wide 
range of possible failures and project the outcome, often in a short timescale and 
without sufficient information. These aspects increase the probability of error 
involving many human biases when deciding to go or not to go. 
Currently pilot simulator training often presents RTOs as engine-related events 
while the Takeoff Safety Training Aid gives recommendations about other failure 
conditions to consider. As already noted, the majority of all RTO accidents were 
                                               
6
 These delays in reactions can sometimes be longer than the expanded transition times used in 
AFM for RTO performance calculations. 
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not related to engine problems. In these cases it is possible that the pilots were 
not fully prepared to recognise cues of other anomalies during takeoff. The data 
analysed for this paper indicate that pilots often interpret these other anomalies 
(like a tire burst) as events that threaten the safety of flight and decide to reject 
the takeoff at any speed. Looking through the eyes of the pilots, making a proper 
Go/No Go decision is not always simple.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS 
Since the introduction of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid: 
 
• Accident/serious incident rate of high speed rejected takeoffs has 
dropped by 25%; 
• There is no unambiguous proof that that this reduction is the result of 
the Takeoff Safety Training Aid; 
• Reasons for conducting a high speed rejected takeoff are the same as 
before the training aid; 
• Many high speed rejected takeoffs (44%) should not have been conducted. 
This number is only slightly less than before the introduction of the 
training aid (51%); 
• Pilots have difficulties in recognising “unsafe to fly” conditions; 
• The Detection-Decision-Action process still takes a lot of time! 
• 82% of the RTOs were non-engine related which is similar to before the 
training aid. 
 
The training aid emphasised the need to adhere to the V1 decision-making 
concept and highlighted the inevitability of an overrun if a rejected takeoff is 
initiated after V1. The present study shows that there is still plenty of room to 
improve takeoff safety and reduce the number of unwarranted rejected takeoffs 
above V1. 
 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
• It is recommended to bring the Takeoff Safety Training Aid back to the 
attention of the flight community. This should not be limited to operators 
of large jets only. Also the operators of smaller jets or turboprops should 
be considered in this effort. Some topics in Takeoff Safety Training Aid 
might need a revision (e.g. more attention how to recognise unsafe flight 
conditions). 
• Pilots should also be trained for RTO events other than engine failure. 
• It is furthermore recommended to gain more up-to-date insight in the 
pilot’s behaviour during rejected takeoffs. This can be done through the 
use of training simulators. For this unannounced problems (e.g. engine 
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failures, tire failures etc.) could be introduced during takeoffs conducted 
as part the regular simulator training of commercial airline pilots. 
Decision times and reaction times should be recorded and analysed. 
• Operators should evaluate the takeoff training safety aid information and 
incorporate this in guidance and procedures. This could adjust the 
perception of unforeseeable/complex ‘evaluation’ situations towards the 
more foreseeable ‘if - then’ rule based situations. 
 
  
 
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2010-177 
April 2010  25 
 
7 REFERENCES AND RECOMMENDED READING 
MATERIAL 
• Flament, E. Review of the Rejected Takeoff procedure, Airbus, 15th 
Performance and Operation Conference, 2007. 
 
• Range of V1, Boeing, 2001. 
 
• Root, R. V1 and the Go / No Go decision, Boeing, 2002. 
 
• Revisiting the “Stop or Go” Decision, Flight Operations Briefing Notes, 
Airbus, 2005. 
 
• Runway Overruns Following High Speed Rejected Takeoffs. NTSB Report 
Number: SIR-90-02, 1990. 
 
• Takeoff Safety Training Aid. FAA, 1993.  
 
• Harris, D. and Khan, H.. Response time to reject a takeoff. Human Factors 
and Aerospace Safety 3(2), 163-173, 2003. 
 
• Qantas Flight Operations Information and Safety Bulletin No. 6/70, 1970. 
 
• Orasanu, J. Training for Effective Crew Decision Making. Aviation 
Education 2020 Workshop #2, Monterey, CA  January 30, 2001. 
 
• Van Es, G.W.H. Runway Excursions from a European perspective: 
Mitigating measures and preventing actions, NLR/Eurocontrol, 2010. 
 
• Pope, J. Facing the overrun dilemma. FSF Accident Prevention, 1990. 
 
• Roberson, W.C., Shontz, W.D. A Study of Decision Making and 
Performance in Rejected Takeoffs. Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 
SAE paper 921134, 1992. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
The author would like to thank all persons that reviewed this paper. Their 
comments improved the quality this paper. 
